A rogue edge computing device was connected to the onboard network, underscoring the critical need for robust physical security measures, according to analysts.
An incident involving a ferry recently highlighted a significant physical security vulnerability for enterprises. An attacker reportedly connected a small computer, a Raspberry Pi, to the vessel’s network in an attempt to infiltrate its operations. One analyst suggested that a similar physical attack could compromise approximately half of all enterprises.
The ferry was reportedly “immobilized Saturday in the southern French port of Sète as it prepared to sail to Algeria” due to this attempted attack, as detailed in a Bloomberg report. The Raspberry Pi was equipped with a cellular modem, which would have allowed remote access to the ferry’s internal network and external communications.
Fortunately, the attack was thwarted due to effective onboard security protocols. Investigators noted that network segregation between office and operational systems, combined with the lack of remote access to critical controls, prevented lateral movement and eliminated the possibility of sabotage or hijacking.
Enterprise Controls: Overlooking Key Vulnerabilities
This incident raises concerns for enterprise cybersecurity executives regarding the resilience of their land-based facilities—including offices, retail outlets, and manufacturing plants—against similar physical intrusions. Security experts expressed pessimism about how these environments would withstand such an attack.
Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, stated that “most enterprise security programs are still built for the wrong kind of intruder. They are built for the person who breaks in, not the person who walks in. And the rogue device story is the clearest signal of that shift.” He added that “a Raspberry Pi class device with a cellular modem is not just a clever gadget, it is a way to create a new perimeter from inside your building.”
Gogia emphasized that attackers can bypass traditional defenses by introducing their own internet connection, effectively creating a new entry point within a building. This means that many existing security controls might be ineffective, as traffic routed through a cellular connection would not pass through monitored gateways, leaving security operations centers (SOCs) unaware of the breach.
Fred Chagnon, principal research director at Info-Tech Research Group, echoed these concerns.
Chagnon noted that many offices contain numerous active Ethernet ports in public and semi-public areas. He recommended that these ports be disabled by default at the switch level, only activating them upon verification of a specific, authorized MAC address through 802.1X authentication.
He further advised that modern attackers often employ MAC spoofing to disguise devices like a Raspberry Pi as legitimate network hardware, such as VoIP phones or printers. CISOs should consider investing in tools like Sepio or advanced Network Access Controls (NACs) that utilize physical layer fingerprinting. These tools can analyze hardware’s electrical and timing characteristics to identify if a seemingly innocuous device is, in fact, a Linux-based implant.
Chagnon also suggested implementing port locks requiring a key and tamper-evident tape on chassis and ports. He recommended that security sweeps actively search for unusual wiring, unauthorized USB hubs, or unidentified small devices. Furthermore, he proposed that if a restricted area door opens and an unknown device simultaneously appears on the local switch, the SOC should receive a high-priority alert.
Forrester Senior Analyst Paddy Harrington observed that many enterprise security executives overlook the vulnerability of IoT and OT devices, which are often prime targets. He noted that security personnel frequently focus on the intended function of shadow devices, like fitness trackers, rather than the potential access they could provide for a backdoor attack.
Harrington asserted that direct plug-and-play access to Ethernet ports should not be permitted; devices must be authenticated. He estimated that half of all enterprises compromise device security, questioning why, for instance, IoT lightbulbs would ever require access to financial data.
Harrington reported encountering resistance from enterprise security leaders regarding physical security. He cited a recent conversation about network segmentation where an executive stated that such extensive segmentation would be too time-consuming and costly, with resources being allocated elsewhere.
Harrington dismissed this as an inadequate justification.
Conversely, Flavio Villanustre, CISO for the LexisNexis Risk Solutions Group, acknowledged the difficulty in preventing these types of physical attacks.
Villanustre explained that the widespread availability of affordable and powerful single-board computers like the Raspberry Pi complicates the issue. While network intrusion detection should ideally flag behavioral anomalies, this becomes challenging in large, complex networks where a Raspberry Pi might mimic a standard IoT device. He also considered the possibility that such a device might connect to an older serial bus within a ship’s control systems rather than the main network.
Handling Rogue Devices: A Cautious Approach
Villanustre advised extreme caution when discovering such a device.
He warned that disconnecting the device without proper care could lead to the loss of crucial forensic data. Many such devices can be configured with a small battery or supercapacitor to self-wipe upon disconnection or tampering. Attempting to send false information is also difficult, as it requires knowledge of the device’s specific protocols. A more serious concern is the potential for the device to be linked to other ship systems, potentially triggering damaging actions or even detonating explosives if mishandled.
Kaveh Ranjibar, CEO of Whisper Security, recommended immediate isolation and forensic analysis for such physical discoveries. He stressed a critical pre-removal step: mapping the ‘blast radius’ by capturing the device’s network traffic to identify its communications and queried domains before physical disconnection.
Ranjibar explained that infrastructure intelligence can often help attribute the actor by analyzing the command-and-control servers used, which can indicate whether the threat originates from a casual attacker or a sophisticated operation like the GRU, all before physically interacting with the hardware.
Ranjibar noted that when these devices communicate externally, they often disclose valuable information.
He elaborated that a rogue device, even one with a cellular modem, leaves an infrastructure footprint when it ‘phones home’ for commands or data exfiltration. This footprint includes a new IP address, DNS resolution, or a connection to a specific Autonomous System Number (ASN).
Ranjibar concluded that CISOs must extend their monitoring beyond internal LANs to include continuous external infrastructure surveillance. He suggested that if a device within a facility begins communicating with a network block associated with state-sponsored malware, or if a new ‘shadow asset’ emerges on the perimeter, this should serve as an immediate alert. While the individual planting the device might not be apprehended, the device’s internet connection should be detected instantly.
